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In the western hemisphere, 1954 was a year of ends and beginnings. For 
the masses of the small Central American state Guatemala, this year 
marked the premature end of a period of reform and relative prosperity 
known as the “Ten Years of Spring.” Beginning in 1944 with a popular 
uprising against the dictatorial Jorge Ubico, the Guatemalan spring 
allowed for democracy to take root in a region previously characterized 
by oppression, exploitation, and inequality. Only ten years later, this era 
saw its end with the 1954 coup d’état of the democratically elected leftist 
reformer, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. To the north, in the upper 
echelons of the United States government and a nascent, increasingly 
powerful organization called the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1954 
marked something else altogether: the moment at which U.S. covert 
action became accepted as the most effective tool to contain, suppress, 
and eliminate anything resembling communist ideology or Soviet 
influence abroad—particularly in Latin America, the United States’ own 
“backyard.” 
A prominent military leader of the 1944 revolution, Arbenz came 
to power in 1950 on a wave of popular support with the promise of 
progressive land reforms. Arbenz emphasized social justice, sympathized 
with labor unions, and sought to curb the excesses and exploitative 
powers historically enjoyed by foreign capital within Guatemala—namely, 
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the monopolistic United Fruit Company.1 This, in addition to his 
legalization in 1952 of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), 
Guatemala’s fledgling communist party, made the CIA wary of Arbenz 
and his growing intimacy with leaders of the PGT. Ruling out direct 
intervention, and in large part acting autonomously of the Eisenhower 
administration, certain members of the CIA crafted operation 
PBSUCCESS, a covert effort by which the U.S. sought to investigate, 
undermine, and ultimately overthrow the Arbenz regime.2 
Why in Guatemala, and why against Arbenz, did the CIA 
intervene? What factors gave rise to and facilitated the efficacy of the 
Agency’s covert operations? In spite of its glaring shortcomings and 
catastrophic long-term consequences for the Guatemalan people, why 
was PBSUCCESS considered a victory within the ranks of the CIA and 
U.S. government as well as the general American public? What were the 
ramifications of this alleged “success” for the future of U.S. foreign 
policy in the Cold War? 
In addition to analyzing the historical sociopolitical dynamics in 
Guatemala prior to and during the Ten Years of Spring that shaped 
Arbenz’s rise to prominence, this paper is primarily concerned with U.S.-
Guatemalan relations, the miscommunications and misconceptions 
between the two nations that are characteristic of international affairs 
during the Cold War era, and the CIA’s innovations in proxy warfare and 
covert tactics. Taking a two-pronged approach in analyzing the events 
culminating in 1954, I first consider Guatemala’s Ten Years of Spring 
from the perspective of Guatemalans themselves. Next, I review that 
same period of time from the different perspective of the U.S. 
government. The juxtaposition of these perceptions exposes the 
discrepancies between the two and, to a significant degree, sheds light on 
each party’s seemingly inscrutable actions.  
Finally, I consider the implications of the CIA’s intervention in 
Guatemala on the future. Cold War history demonstrates that the United 
States often generalized and oversimplified the nature of its enemies as 
well as their successes; past U.S. accomplishments abroad were assumed 
transferable to other predicaments that were only nominally similar. By 
mistaking their chaotic Guatemalan exploits for unconditional success, 
the U.S. government willingly implemented a decades-long series of 
covert operations in the western hemisphere that destabilized the region, 
isolated the U.S., and brought to power many of the infamous Latin 
American dictatorships of the century’s latter half. Thus this paper 
                                                       
1 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 146. 
2 Richard H. Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History,” Political Science 
Quarterly, 95.4 (Winter 1980-1981), 629-653.  
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argues, ultimately, in favor of historical sensitivity that the United States 
so clearly lacked in its Latin American exploits. 
 
“Ten Years of Spring”: Guatemala Breaks from its Past 
 
The People & The Land 
 
In the context of modern Guatemalan and Latin American 
history, the revolution of 1944 and the consequent policies that fostered 
democratization, social equality, and wealth redistribution represented a 
marked break from the past. Historically characterized by oppression and 
plagued by socioeconomic inequality, the Guatemala that took shape 
following the 1944 revolution—particularly in the Arbenz years—was 
radical only in the sense that it took one bold step forward toward 
equality after centuries of taking far too many steps back.  
Overrun and exploited like most postcolonial Latin American 
states, Guatemala emerged on the international stage and proved most 
profitable (albeit for very few landed elites) at the turn of the 20th century 
when the coffee boom struck; immediately, Central America became a 
lucrative region for foreign investors.3 In order to maximize gains for 
wealthy landowners, cheap labor was key. Naturally, the impoverished 
and already subjugated indigenous peoples of Guatemala were exploited 
on these thriving coffee plantations, providing low-cost labor on a 
massive scale. Indeed, as one planter said, “Not the soil but rather the 
low wages of our laborers are the wealth of the Cobán,” a city at the 
heart of Guatemala’s central coffee-growing region.4 However, Nick 
Cullather writes, following the collapse of the coffee market in 1930:  
 
ladinos [land-owning persons of mixed European and Native 
American ancestry] needed a strong leader to prevent restive, 
unemployed laborers from gaining an upper hand, and they 
chose a ruthless, efficient provincial governor, Jorge Ubico, to 
lead the country. Ubico suppressed dissent, legalized the 
killing of Indians by landlords, enlarged the Army, and 
organized a personal Gestapo.5 
 
Given U.S. and other global economic interests in Guatemala, Ubico’s 
dictatorship was looked upon favorably in the eyes of foreign investors in 
                                                       
3 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in 
Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 9.  
4 Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in 
Guatemala, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 
10.  
5 Cullather, Secret History, 9-10.  
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that it promoted political stability—at the expense, no doubt, of the 
laboring masses. The so-called (and ironically titled) “October 
Revolution” of 1944 was thus a unique turn in Guatemalan history not 
simply because a stable electoral democracy took root in its wake, but 
because the reforms initiated by Arévalo, and later Arbenz, set in motion 
an era of change that altered the Guatemalan people’s very relationship 
with the land on which they labored.  
While Guatemalans enjoyed far more liberties after the October 
Revolution than those allowed under Ubico, the Arévalo regime was—
even from the perspective of the United States—moderate at best.6 
Arévalo’s 1947 Labor Code, for example, revealed the limited extent to 
which his administration was willing to initiate radical reforms on behalf 
of workers. Although the new Labor Code granted “the right to unionize 
and strike, protected against unfair firings, mandated a forty-eight-hour 
workweek, regulated the labor of children and women, and set basic 
health and safety guidelines for the workplace,” it afforded “its most 
important benefits and protections to industrial laborers or permanent 
employees on large plantations…[precluding] possible alliances between 
workers and peasants.”7 Until the bolder Arbenz reforms of the early 
1950s were implemented, planters under Arévalo still retained much of 
the autonomy they had enjoyed during Ubico’s reign, thus giving them a 
free hand over both corrupt municipal governments and their laborers. 
 
Becoming a Reformer: The Enigmatic Jacobo Arbenz 
 
The election of Jacobo Arbenz in 1950 signified a further break 
from the past—not only from Ubico, but also, in many ways, his 
disappointingly moderate predecessor and fellow revolutionary, Arévalo. 
Agrarian reform, writes Arne Westad, was “the centerpiece of [Arbenz’s] 
administration—in Guatemala, landless peasants constituted more than 
half of the population, while 91 percent of arable land was controlled by 
big landowners or, directly or indirectly, by foreign companies.”8 While 
Arbenz’s land reform required complex planning and was slow to gain 
traction within his government, his goal was simple: expropriate unused 
portions of large private landholdings to the landless peasantry. Arbenz 
voiced his progressive intentions in straightforward language before the 
public, declaring at his inauguration speech: 
 
                                                       
6 Cullater, Secret History, 11.  
7 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 50-51.  
8 Westad, The Global Cold War, 146.  
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All the riches of Guatemala are not as important as the life, 
the freedom, the dignity, the health and the happiness of the 
most humble of its people…. But we must distribute these 
riches so that those who have less—and they are the immense 
majority—benefit more, while those who have more—and 
they are so few—also benefit, but to a lesser extent. How 
could it be otherwise, given the poverty, the poor health, and 
the lack of education of our people?9 
 
Such rhetoric reveals Arbenz to be a reasonable man aware of and 
sympathetic to those suffering the inequalities plaguing Guatemalan 
society; he was clearly cognizant of the vast socioeconomic discrepancy 
between the wealthy few and the impoverished masses. And, perhaps 
most indicative of his left-leaning philosophy and leadership style, 
Arbenz explicitly affirmed in the above passage that wealth was 
secondary to the quality of life of Guatemala’s citizens—particularly the 
poorest among them. His sensitivity to the downtrodden, not to mention 
his apparent disinterest in personal gain and opportunism, was unheard 
of within the ranks of Guatemalan leadership prior to the 1944 
revolution. Incredibly, Arbenz regarded Guatemala’s marginalized 
indigenous population not as a sub-human or undeserving people, but 
fellow Guatemalans as worthy of equal treatment and self-determination 
within a democratic political system as any landowning elite. As Greg 
Grandin writes, “Such sentiments were not only needed in a country that 
had suffered decades of graft, dictatorship, and poverty but practically 
insurgent in a polity that expected little more than manipulation and 
opportunism from its rulers.”10 Even before agrarian reform became law, 
Arbenz was revolutionary merely by his perspective, political philosophy, 
and outlook on society. 
Arbenz is an enigmatic figure whose historical significance 
cannot be overstated. Unlike the radical socialist that the United States 
portrayed him to be (see below), I argue that Arbenz was a middle-class 
intellectual and socially conscious young man with aspirations to reform 
the socioeconomic inequalities plaguing his country. Put simply, to his 
own detriment, Arbenz was in the wrong place at the wrong time: 
Arbenz initiated his egalitarian reforms just as the Cold War was 
beginning to heat up; to his north, the United States was wary of all signs 
of communist activity—whether real or imagined—such that Arbenz’s 
land reforms and close friendships with members of the communist PGT 
inevitably bred mistrust among U.S. officials. Records show that there 
was nothing inherently threatening in Arbenz’s intentions to reform 
Guatemala. Contrary to U.S. assumptions, Arbenz was in fact not in 
                                                       
9  Westad, The Global Cold War, 147.  
10 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 53.  
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direct talks with the Soviets. The U.S. was correct only in that Arbenz 
indeed sought to perturb the status quo. 
Born to a middle-class ladino woman and a Swiss-born 
pharmacist, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán lived comfortably in his youth. 
Though Arbenz would have preferred to attend university and pursue his 
academic interests, his father’s morphine addiction—and later, his 
suicide—left the family with little money. Suddenly lacking the means to 
pursue his education, Arbenz enrolled in the Escuela Politécnica, 
Guatemala’s finest military academy, where he excelled academically and 
quickly ascended the ranks of the Guatemalan military.11  
Declassified CIA documents and interviews with his closest 
friends reveal that Arbenz was a sensitive, intelligent, and meditative 
young man driven by his sense of morality to realize the reforms he 
considered necessary for a brighter Guatemalan future. As his wife María 
Vilanova de Arbenz recalled many years later, having only just met 
Jacobo Arbenz, she asked him, “ ‘What would you like to be?’ And very 
seriously he answered, ‘I would like to be a reformer.’ ”12 Indeed, reform 
would soon become the trademark of Arbenz’s presidency. First, 
however, he would need to find partners with whom to collaborate. In a 
government brimming with complacent politicians, Arbenz was left with 
few routes to take. 
 
The Kitchen Cabinet: Arbenz Finds Allies in the PGT 
 
The year following Arbenz’s inspiring inaugural speech saw little 
radical reform in land or public works—not because Arbenz had given 
up, but because allies, even within his own party, were hard to come by. 
Governing members of the majority Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), 
Gleijeses writes, “focused their attention on other matters: their leaders 
besieged Arbenz in their incessant quest for personal gain, quarreling 
among themselves for his favour; agrarian reform was not among their 
preoccupations.”13 Even the deputy chief of the U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala, notes Grandin, reported to the State Department that 
Guatemala’s non-Communist politicians of the time “were a group of 
bums of first order; lazy, ambitious, they wanted money, were palace 
                                                       
11 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 
1944-1954 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1991), 136.  
12 Ibid., 135. For more helpful insights into the personal life of Jacobo Arbenz, 
see Gleijeses and his interviews with María de Arbenz, PGT confidants like José 
Manuel Fortuny, and others. For CIA documents on Arbenz, refer to the 
discussion on Arbenz’s mental health below.  
13 Piero Gleijeses, “The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 21.3 (October, 1989), 453-480.  
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hangers-on.”14 Contrary to the PAR name, these opportunistic and 
ideologically mainstream politicians were disappointingly un-
revolutionary.  
Arbenz was a rarity among politicians of his time in that he was 
an honest leader determined to keep his promises. Even the CIA, in their 
early notes on Arbenz, referred to the young Guatemalan as “brilliant” 
and “cultured.”15 As Guatemala’s elected leader, Arbenz intended to act 
on his campaign promises of agrarian reform and land redistribution. Far 
from being an election ploy or a hollow promise, Arbenz, the self-
proclaimed “reformer,” indeed sought genuine social reformation. 
Ironically, for his own government and for the United States, his morality 
was an issue. Arbenz was not a dictator, nor did he aspire to be one. 
Rather than force reform upon his government, Arbenz committed 
himself to working within the bounds of the Guatemalan legal system. 
Any of his reforms, then, had to first pass through congress—which, to 
the detriment of his cause, consisted chiefly of self-serving, only 
nominally “revolutionary” politicians who were unwilling to tamper with 
Guatemala’s unjust socioeconomic status quo. 
On the other hand, those few politicians who were genuine 
revolutionaries also happened to be members of the national communist 
party, the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), or Guatemalan Party of 
Labor. Increasingly, Piero Gleijeses writes: 
  
Arbenz appreciated the honesty and the discipline of a small 
group of friends—the leaders of the clandestine [PGT], men 
like Alfredo Guerra Borges, Mario Silva Jonama and, above 
all, José Manuel Fortuny, the party’s Secretary General. These 
men, who were to become Arbenz’s kitchen cabinet, sought 
advantage not for themselves, but for their cause; alone 
among the government’s supporters, they had a programme 
that was specific, at least by Guatemalan standards. Arbenz 
was increasingly attracted to this as the best hope for the 
Guatemalan people and nation, but he had no plan to turn 
Guatemala into a communist nation. Both he and the party 
believed that domestic and international constraints rendered 
such a transformation impossible in the foreseeable future.16 
 
As we have seen, Arbenz was a fair-minded nationalist who sought above 
all else the common welfare of the Guatemalan people. Disappointed in 
his own party’s lack of vision and revolutionary will, however, Arbenz 
reverted—more or less secretly, ultimately to his own detriment—to 
                                                       
14 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 52. 
15 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 142. 
16 Gleijeses, “Agrarian Reform,” 455.  
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collaboration with the PGT in an effort to set in motion his reforms. 
According to Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, a PAR member and senior 
politician for the Arbenz administration, “When Arbenz became 
president, the government parties were fighting among themselves over 
who got what posts. What help could Arbenz expect from them in his 
struggle for agrarian reform? Their programme was opportunistic; that of 
the communist party was honest.”17 
Thus, Arbenz was caught in a sort of ideological tug-of-war. To 
his right stood the PAR, Arbenz’s own party, with which the anti-
communist military was closely allied; although this was the party that led 
the 1944 revolution, its members in office had become complacent by 
1950, preferring the status quo—established under Arévalo’s term—to 
further reforms. And to the left stood the PGT, a small but vivacious 
party whose members shared Arbenz’s dreams of true reform and 
mirrored his will to make them a reality. The position in which he found 
himself was uncertain and cruelly ironic: Arbenz was not a communist, 
and yet, upon taking office, the communists represented his best hope to 
fulfill his dream of social justice. 
While the PGT was a relatively new force within Guatemalan 
politics, its Marxist roots ran much deeper in Guatemala’s history. The 
country’s first communist party, established in 1922, had been abolished 
during Ubico’s dictatorship ten years later. Only after ousting Ubico did 
certain PAR members with Marxist tendencies begin to meet 
clandestinely to form the PGT—in their own words, “a vanguard party, a 
party of the proletariat based on Marxism-Leninism”18—during the 
presidency of Arévalo, who rejected any outright communist 
expression.19 But having forged close relations with the PGT early in his 
presidency for the abovementioned reasons, Arbenz granted the 
communist party legal status in 1952, a political move that immediately 
caught the attention of the U.S. State Department as well as the CIA.20 
                                                       
17 Ibid., 456. This statement comes from an interview with Charnaud conducted 
between 1978 and 1988, long after the 1954 coup against Arbenz. Interestingly, 
Charnaud himself appears to be one of the “opportunistic” politicians of whom 
he speaks; it is difficult to determine from this excerpt whether Charnaud regrets 
the PAR’s behavior. In any case, that Charnaud recognizes in hindsight the 
PAR’s opportunism and the PGT’s sincerity reveals how communists in 
Guatemala were stigmatized for being labeled “communists,” much like the 
United States in the age of McCarthyism. As the above passage shows, despite 
their honesty and good intentions, Guatemalan communists were a marginalized 
political group of which others were suspicious on superficial grounds. 
18 Cullather, Secret History, 14.  
19 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 52.  
20 See records from the Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm. 
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Meeting secretly in late 1951, Arbenz and the PGT leaders with 
whom he had grown close (Fortuny most of all) began mapping out their 
plans for agrarian reform. The drafted legislation was presented to 
Arbenz’s cabinet by April 1952 and came before Congress soon after. In 
spite of the PAR’s reservations, the Church’s criticisms, and the landed 
elite’s disparaging remarks and outcries against such blatant 
“Bolshevism,” Arbenz stood by his reform: in the words of senior 
administration official Manuel Galich, agrarian reform had become “the 
heart of [Arbenz’s] program, almost an obsession.”21 On 17 June 1952, 
after passed in Congress under significant pressure from the president, 
Arbenz signed into law Decreto 900, the agrarian reform legislation—a feat 
toward which he had been working all his life. Sadly and ironically, it was 
this sincere achievement, this idealistic view of what a reformed 
Guatemala might become, that led to Arbenz’s fall from power at the 
hands of the CIA only two years later.  
 
Ten Years of Tension: The U.S. Interpretation 
 
Guatemala’s “Ten Years of Spring” looked rather different—and 
far more sinister—from the northern view. For Washington, Jorge 
Ubico’s demise and Arévalo’s modest reforms made the hemisphere 
increasingly vulnerable to the threats posed by foreign ideologies—
namely, international communism. The United States had looked 
favorably upon Ubico’s firm anti-communism and pro-capitalist policies. 
But as Cold War tensions mounted following World War II, so too did 
U.S. suspicion toward its revolutionary Central American neighbor where 
their strongman, Ubico, had suddenly been replaced with the 
democratically elected Arévalo. While the U.S.’s sensationalized reaction 
to Arévalo’s moderate reforms was minimal compared with the (literal) 
attacks later launched against Arbenz’s agrarian reform, any discussion of 
American intervention in Guatemala must begin with the origin of 
conflict: United Fruit.  
 
The United Fruit Company 
 
While the recent scholarship on the Arévalo and Arbenz regimes 
largely concurs that U.S. government officials’ personal economic 
interests in multinational corporations like the United Fruit Company 
(UFCO) were not the primary motivation for intervention in Guatemala, 
and that these interests were secondary to the larger perceived threat of 
international communism in the western hemisphere, the historical 
complexities that led to the CIA-backed coup in 1954 cannot be 
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32 | Cold War Heat Wave  
 
adequately appreciated without first understanding the role that United 
Fruit historically played in the region and within the U.S. government 
itself.  
In their revealing account, Bitter Fruit, Schlesinger and Kinzer 
make the compelling argument that the U.S. might never have given any 
thought to Guatemala had it not been for the government’s vested 
economic interests in United Fruit’s unperturbed success. “Without 
United Fruit’s troubles,” they claim: 
 
It seems probable that the Dulles brothers might not have 
paid such intense attention to the few Communists in 
Guatemala, since larger numbers had taken part in political 
activity on a greater scale during the postwar years in Brazil, 
Chile, and Costa Rica without causing excessive concern in 
the U.S. government.22 
 
Facts verify this argument’s basic assertions: the PGT was very small, 
communist activity flourished throughout Latin America following World 
War II, and high-ranking U.S. government officials like Allen and John 
Foster Dulles were directly involved in United Fruit’s business.23 
Gleijeses counters this approach, however, arguing instead that the 
communist parties in all other Latin American countries had been banned 
by 1948, whereas in early 1950s Guatemala, under Arbenz’s protection, 
the communist PGT gained influence.24 Therefore, he concludes, under 
Arévalo in “the forties, UFCO was, to a great extent, the interpreter of 
matters Guatemalan. In the fifties, its role had become marginal.”25 In 
                                                       
22 Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the 
American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1982), 106.  
23 See Cullather, Secret History; and Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre. 
On the prominence of communists in the Arbenz administration, Cullather 
notes, “The PGT contributed little to Arbenz’s victory in 1950, but it gained 
influence under the new regime. Total party membership never exceeded 4,000 
in a nation of almost three million, a fact reflected in the party’s weakness at the 
polls. Only four Communists held seats in the 61-member congress, a body 
dominated by moderates. Arbenz did not appoint any Communists to the 
Cabinet, and only six or seven held significant sub-Cabinet posts. Those few, 
however, occupied positions that made them highly visible to United States 
officials, controlling state radio and newspaper and holding high posts in the 
agrarian department and the social security administration,” 21-22. Gleijeses’s 
argument (see footnote 24) supports this claim that the PGT, while formally very 
weak, exercised enormous informal power within the government due to its 
members’ intimacy with Arbenz.  
24 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 362. 
25 Ibid., 363. 
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Gleijeses’s view, then, Bitter Fruit fails to adequately acknowledge that 
communist influences were in fact present in the Arbenz administration; 
being aware of this by the time agrarian reform was implemented, UFCO 
became a secondary priority for the CIA, which assigned primary 
importance to containing and eliminating the communism that had 
already taken root. 
While Gleijeses’s reasoning is sound, it is important that we not 
lose sight of the role that United Fruit did play. Specifically, I argue in the 
remainder of this section that United Fruit was responsible for sparking 
U.S. distrust of Guatemala in the first place when it portrayed itself the 
victim of Arévalo’s moderate reforms; that throughout Guatemala’s “Ten 
Years of Spring,” United Fruit’s alleged victimization at the hands of 
Arévalo and Arbenz was used to justify covert U.S. behavior in the 
region; and that Arbenz’s ties to the PGT did not necessarily indicate a 
Soviet threat to the western hemisphere.26 
 
Down with Ubico, Down with UFCO? 
 
It is no coincidence that the United Fruit Company had earned 
the nickname El Pulpo—Spanish for “The Octopus”—among 
Guatemalans: its corporate “tentacles” reached throughout the country, 
giving it power over every major enterprise—including the railroad, 
electric utility, the telegraph system, and, of course, tens of thousands of 
Guatemalan workers and the millions of acres of land on which they 
labored.27 The product of a corporate merger between a Central 
American railroad company and the Boston Fruit Company in 1899, 
UFCO was, by 1945, Guatemala’s largest private landowner and 
employer as well as the world’s largest grower and exporter of bananas.28 
Predictably, UFCO had become one of Ubico’s closest allies: 
many of United Fruit’s “huge banana estates,” writes Cullather, had been 
“a gift from Ubico, who allowed the company a free hand on its 
property.”29 Ubico forcefully maintained an orderly political environment 
conducive to United Fruit’s exploitative practices; wages were depressed, 
working conditions were poor, and workers’ strikes were generally 
suppressed in the name of stability. Popular American magazines like 
Harper’s and Reader’s Digest championed Ubico during World War II, 
                                                       
26 The American public, government, and CIA had made the assumption that 
post-revolutionary Guatemalan administrations were in direct talks with or 
influenced by the USSR. As discussed below, these claims were unsubstantiated 
and remain so to this day.  
27 Cullather, Secret History, 10.  
28 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 88-90.  
29 Cullather, Secret History, 10.  
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portraying him as a strong leader sympathetic to the United States, its 
freedoms, and its capitalist ideals—he was, they wrote, “the biggest man 
in Central America.”30 Furthermore, the special treatment Ubico afforded 
UFCO was exemplary of the historically common rapport between 
oppressive Latin American dictators and foreign imperial powers—an 
archetypal, self-perpetuating relationship that had endured in one form or 
another since colonial times. In this manner, UFCO “executives could 
determine prices, taxes, and the treatment of workers without 
interference from the government. The Untied States Embassy approved 
and until the regime’s final years gave Ubico unstinting support.”31 
Ubico’s close relationship with United Fruit begs the following 
question: when Ubico fell from power at the hands of Guatemalan 
nationalists in 1944, was UFCO, a U.S.-owned company, inevitably 
destined to fall with it? United Fruit’s behavior under the Arévalo 
administration suggests that this was not the case. On the contrary, Ubico 
relied on UFCO to a far greater extent than the latter on the former: it 
appears that UFCO was less interested in maintaining Ubico’s reign than 
preserving its own autonomy from the state; whoever the leader, and so 
long as he refrained from meddling with corporate affairs, UFCO would 
be content. So great was its power, UFCO could reasonably expect the 
Guatemalan state to respect its extralegal sovereignty as a kind of 
kingdom unto itself—even after the “October Revolution” and the 
arrival of a democratically elected president, Juan José Arévalo.  
In order to fully grasp UFCO’s resistance to reforms, we must 
consider the degree to which Arévalo (and later, Arbenz) respected 
Guatemala’s tradition of “servility” to the company, the superpower it 
represented, and its economic interests.32 As discussed above, Arévalo’s 
first years in office—though certainly more liberal than those of his 
predecessors—were relatively moderate. With Cold War tensions rising, 
writes Grandin, Washington was becoming increasingly wary of Latin 
America’s surging nationalism: “Arévalo’s moderate support of United 
Fruit Company labor unions and opposition to Central American and 
                                                       
30 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 21. 
31 Cullather, Secret History, 10. 
32 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 85. Gleijeses also argues that we must consider 
Arévalo’s government in comparison with its Central American neighbors’ more 
oppressive governments. While Arévalo was certainly not radical, the freedoms 
he allowed contrasted sharply with the more dictatorial leadership style of “the 
other banana republics,” like Honduras. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
United Fruit owned capital not only in Guatemala, but throughout Central 
America. For UFCO, the 1944 revolution represented a disturbance in their 
otherwise smooth-running machine of multinational economic dominance and 
political coercion.  
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Caribbean dictators made U.S. officials nervous, but his continued 
proscription of Communism calmed some of their fears.”33 
However, the implementation of Arévalo’s Labor Code in 1947 
was the first major sign that, in line with the nationalist philosophy of the 
1944 revolution, Arévalo would not allow the status quo of foreign 
economic dominance to continue wholly unchallenged. According to 
Cullather, “United Fruit executives regarded any trespass on the 
prerogatives they enjoyed under Ubico as an assault on free enterprise.”34 
It was not the fall of Ubico that threatened United Fruit, then, but rather 
the new government’s unexpected and abrupt pursuit of reforms, 
regardless of how moderate they actually were. For UFCO, the Labor 
Code was seen as an attack not only on capitalism, but United Fruit itself. 
UFCO was particularly condemnatory of a stipulation within the new 
code that required estates employing five hundred or more workers35 to 
provide these workers with more rights, protections, and benefits similar 
to those given industrial laborers.36 Consequently, UFCO launched a 
concerted effort to overturn the new law. Barraging the State 
Department with complaints, the corporation argued that the Arévalo 
administration was “discriminatory” against UFCO for being an 
American-owned business.37 
As early as July 1947, United Fruit began voicing allegations that 
Arévalo’s administration “was subjected to communistic influences 
emanating from outside Guatemala.”38 Such accusations carried much 
weight among an American public increasingly concerned over Cold War 
tensions. These charges signified the beginnings of a greater distrust 
underlying U.S. relations with Guatemala—an environment akin to the 
era of McCarthyism in which all critics of the United States were instantly 
deemed communists or communist sympathizers. While the fall of Ubico 
therefore did not necessarily portend United Fruit’s conflict with the 
Guatemalan government, the corporation’s unfettered activity and 
success depended on the preservation of the longstanding status quo—
that is, minimal state regulation. Arévalo’s 1947 Labor Code was the first 
means by which UFCO’s previously unchallenged autonomy was 
infringed upon, immediately sparking outrage within the upper ranks of 
                                                       
33 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 76.  
34 Cullather, Secret History, 15.  
35 Apart from those belonging to UFCO, Guatemala housed very few such 
estates. In this sense, Arévalo’s Labor Code did indeed target United Fruit more 
than other small landowners. But, of course, this does not necessarily mean that 
Arévalo was discriminating against UFCO for being American-owned, as 
company executives unconvincingly argued.  
36 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 94.  
37 Ibid., 96.  
38 Ibid., 97.  
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American ownership. However, as we will see, United Fruit’s reaction to 
Arévalo’s moderate reforms represents only a fraction of their contempt 
toward Arbenz’s land redistribution five years later.  
 
Overturning Reform, Undoing 1944: CIA Covert Operations 
 
In the eyes of the United States, agrarian reform validated the 
fears that many had long been harboring: that Guatemala’s government 
had fallen prey to communist influence. Increasingly, those in positions 
of power went so far as to assert that Arbenz and the PGT were acting 
on behalf of the Soviets themselves. Although historians consider Decreto 
900 a moderate policy of land redistribution, few in 1951 “saw it as 
anything other than an attack on the wealth and power of Guatemala’s 
propertied elite, and by example, on the social order of the region.”39 
Concerned that agrarian reform would mobilize the previously 
idle, oppressed masses and that a communist Guatemala would give the 
USSR a “foothold” in Latin America, the CIA began exploring new, 
more efficient tactics to address the threat of communism. A proponent 
of swift covert action, Eisenhower provided the CIA with the go-ahead 
to take action against Arbenz on its own terms. 
 
Conflating Iran & Guatemala: The CIA’s Inclination to Presume, Simplify, & 
Generalize 
 
After a failed attempt to oust Arbenz and assassinate his closest 
communist allies at the end of Truman’s presidency in 1952—a poorly 
organized, short-lived, and utterly embarrassing CIA project known as 
PBFORTUNE—newly elected President Eisenhower significantly altered 
the U.S. approach to Cold Warfare: 
 
In the summer of 1953, [Eisenhower] encouraged his advisers 
to revise their strategies for fighting the Cold War. In a series 
of discussions, known as the Solarium talks, administration 
officials explored ways to fulfill Eisenhower’s promises to 
seize the initiative in the global struggle against Communism 
while restraining the growth of the Federal Budget. The result 
was NSC 162/2, a policy known to the public as the “New 
Look.” It stressed the need for a cheaper, more effective 
military striking force that would rely more on mobility, 
nuclear intimidation, and allied armies. The new policy placed 
a greater emphasis on covert action. Eisenhower saw 
clandestine operations as an inexpensive alternative to military 
intervention. He believed that the Cold War was entering a 
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period of protracted, low-level conflict. Relying too much on 
the military would exhaust the economy and leave the United 
States vulnerable. In his mind, finding creative responses to 
Communist penetration of peripheral areas like Guatemala 
posed one of the critical tests of his ability as a leader.40 
 
As generally outlined above, this new approach to combating 
communism seemed the most rational of all possible routes Eisenhower 
might have taken: having entered office promising to cut federal 
spending and reduce government regulation, Eisenhower, a moderately 
conservative Republican, judiciously recognized the economic and 
political dangers of prolonged warfare abroad. As the rhetoric of NSC 
162/2 demonstrates, Eisenhower worked under the assumption that the 
USSR was not only hostile toward the U.S., but actively seeking to 
subvert American influence abroad, as well.41 Because the U.S. military 
was already stationed across the globe—notably in Iran—Eisenhower 
could not realistically afford to bog down the United States elsewhere. 
Covert warfare appeared the logical, cost-efficient way to manage these 
seemingly inexorable threats; the alternative—stretching thin the U.S. 
army wherever communism potentially threatened American 
hegemony—was simply unfeasible.  
However, Eisenhower’s philosophy is flawed in fundamental 
ways. First, his “New Look” rested upon too many presumptions; as the 
Bay of Pigs debacle and the horrific U.S.-backed dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet would later show, Eisenhower’s foreign policy as carried out by 
the CIA was fatally simplistic, short-sighted, and antithetical to America’s 
self-proclaimed values of liberty, justice, and self-determination. NSC 
162/2 fails to suggest that covert operations should be modified 
according to the unique circumstances encountered in each conflict. 
Nowhere in NSC 162/2 is Soviet communism distinguished from 
communism in other regions of the world; the stated plan of action 
accounts for no global diversity, thus assuming universal homogeneity. 
Interestingly, this is reflective of Washington’s superficial ideological 
outlook at the time. “Officials in the State Department, the CIA, and the 
Pentagon,” Cullather writes, “regarded all Communists as Soviet 
                                                       
40 Ibid., 35-37. 
41 For example, one section of NSC 162/2, written under a section titled 
“Nature of the Soviet Threat,” ominously states: “the Soviets will continue to 
seek to divide and weaken the free world coalition, to absorb or win the 
allegiance of the presently uncommitted areas of the world, and to isolate the 
United States, using cold war tactics and the communist apparatus.” The full text 
of NSC 162/2 may be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-
162-2.pdf.  
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agents.”42 If all communists were indeed Soviets, then it would naturally 
follow that all communists might be contained and eliminated in the 
same fashion. This simple logic, however, is unsound once put into 
practice for the simple reason that it fails to consider idiosyncratic 
features of diverse regions, customs, and peoples.43 
Furthermore, multiple times throughout his account, Secret 
History, Cullather alludes to the CIA’s 1953 intervention in Iran—known 
as TPAJAX, or Operation AJAX—and the many ways this early covert 
operation shaped PBSUCCESS in Guatemala. The CIA worked closely 
with Britain to oust Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, a western-
educated Iranian nationalist with aspirations to nationalize the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. Operation Ajax marked “the first U.S. attempt at 
removing a legitimate Third World Government.” Westad writes: 
 
The Iranian coup was in many ways a new departure for U.S. 
foreign policy in the Third World…. For the first time 
Washington had organized in detail the overthrow of a foreign 
government outside its own hemisphere, and—as the CIA 
postmortem made abundantly clear—the results were to its 
satisfaction. Not only had Iran been steered away from chaos 
and a possible Communist takeover, but Washington had also 
shown its hesitant and uncertain European allies that hard 
decisions sometimes had to be taken when confronted with 
Third World crises.44 
 
Although the immediate results of AJAX were certainly to Washington’s 
liking, it was only much later that same decade that the U.S. would grasp 
the Pandora’s box of instability this coup had opened in the region. In 
the meantime, however, basking in their apparent victory, AJAX boosted 
the CIA’s legitimacy in the eyes of its supervisors in the U.S. government: 
the Iranian coup had “elevated the Agency’s reputation to unprecedented 
heights” among policymakers, and Eisenhower saw Iran as “proof that 
covert action could be a potent, flexible weapon in the Cold War”—
precisely the line of argument put forth in NSC 162/2. Meanwhile, 
Secretary of State Dulles and aides to J.C. King, chief of the CIA’s 
Western Hemisphere Division, were ready to again prove the utility of 
covert operations in Guatemala.45 
                                                       
42 Cullather, Secret History, 26.  
43 See the below discussion on the CIA’s failure to find evidence supporting its 
claims that Arbenz, the PGT, or both were in direct talks with and received aid 
from the Soviet Union. 
44 Westad, The Global Cold War, 121-123.  
45 Cullather, Secret History, 38-39.  
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PBSUCCESS was thus set in motion. As in Iran, it was not until 
after the operation had concluded that the CIA would comprehend the 
long-term negative impact of their actions. Nonetheless, as shown above, 
TPAJAX set an optimistic tone for PBSUCCESS in Guatemala in two 
clear ways: first, Operation AJAX gave the Eisenhower administration 
confidence in the CIA’s ability to smoothly carry out covert objectives of 
this nature; second, and perhaps more importantly, events in Iran made 
the CIA more confident in itself. A young agency created in the midst of 
the Cold War, the CIA was under enormous pressure to protect national 
security but to do so in total silence. It is psychologically plausible that 
the CIA became far more assured of itself following the “success” in 
Iran—hence the codename for the new operation, PBSUCCESS. In any 
case, when AJAX in Iran proved to the Eisenhower administration that 
the CIA was competent, plans were made to utilize in Guatemala “all of 
the tactics that had proved useful in previous covert operations,” 
including psychological, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions.46 
Herein lies the major flaw underlying U.S. interventions in Iran 
and Guatemala as well as those carried out later in the Cold War: the CIA 
knew next to nothing about the politics, the histories, or the peoples of 
the countries in which they clandestinely intervened. Apart from 
psychoanalyzing Arbenz as best they could from afar,47 the CIA 
operatives conducting PBSUCCESS were ignorant of the young Arbenz’s 
idealism, his deeply ingrained sense of social justice, and his aspirations to 
reform Guatemala for the betterment of its people. Similarly, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the CIA made efforts to appreciate the 
history of the Guatemalan population—particularly the indigenous Maya, 
marginalized and exploited since colonizers first arrived centuries earlier. 
In short, the CIA exhibited no historical sensitivity. 
                                                       
46 Cullather, Secret History, 40. 
47 See “Clinical Report on Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala,” a 
classified CIA report filed 12 April 1954, at http://www.foia.cia.gov. This 
report, in addition to others filed during the late 1940s and early ‘50s, suggests 
that the CIA paid special attention to the state of Arbenz’s mental health. With 
striking accuracy, this report acknowledges the occurrences in Arbenz’s youth 
that might have brought on his poor mental health. The earlier discussion on 
Arbenz’s youth corroborates these claims. Reports indicate that Arbenz was 
prone to anxiety, depression, and nervous breakdowns. While these reports are 
only tangentially relevant, they demonstrate the measures the CIA took to 
familiarize themselves with their “enemies.” Ironically, despite these efforts, the 
CIA still failed to appreciate the complexities of Arbenz’s character, ultimately 
labeling him a “communist” in a definitive, unambiguous manner. Predictably, 
American newspapers only magnified this superficiality. (See the below 
discussion of psychological warfare, propaganda, and the media.) 
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Rather, the lofty ambitions enshrined in PBSUCCESS simply 
mirror the overconfidence of the operation’s designers: “Despite the lack 
of hard information on Guatemalan politics and society, planners were 
sure Guatemalans would respond to stratagems proven in Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia.”48 Blinded by postwar tensions and Cold War 
paranoia, the formula by which the United States determined its enemies 
went as follows: anyone who associates himself with communists is 
necessarily a communist; and anyone who is a communist is necessarily 
dangerous to the American way of life (that is, its global hegemony), no 
matter how powerless or far away that communist may be from the 
United States itself. This is the simplistic narrative that overpowered U.S. 
foreign policy and captured the imaginations of the American public as 
operation PBSUCCESS entered into force.  
All of this suggests that the CIA—as well as the general 
American public—was inclined to view communism in an unambiguous, 
black and white manner. For all the resources available to its operatives, 
the CIA’s inability or unwillingness to investigate and differentiate the 
idiosyncrasies of Guatemalan communism (as opposed to the 
oversimplified perception of international Soviet communism) shows the 
Agency’s narrow-mindedness and shortsightedness. 
 
Selling “Red Jacobo”: Propaganda in the Age of “Psywar” 
 
PBSUCCESS was a covert supplement to traditional overt 
diplomatic initiatives. While John Peurifoy—the confrontational, ill-
mannered U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala—badgered the Arbenz 
administration for any revealing information, CIA operatives were 
laboring in every way to undermine Arbenz’s legitimacy—both in 
Guatemala as well as the United States. Covert operations in Iran, writes 
Cullather:  
 
Had demonstrated the potency of propaganda—
“psychological warfare”—aimed at discrediting an enemy and 
building support for allies. Like many Americans, U.S. 
officials placed tremendous faith in the new science of 
advertising…. In 1951, the Truman administration tripled the 
budget for propaganda and appointed a Psychological Strategy 
Board to coordinate activities. The CIA required “psywar” 
training for new agents, who studied Paul Linebarger’s text, 
Psychological Warfare.49 
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Declassified documents reveal the extent to which the CIA considered 
Guatemala a testing ground of sorts in which a variety of psywar tactics 
were utilized and later reapplied in other covert operations throughout 
the hemisphere—most notably, in Cuba. These tactics included radio 
propaganda campaigns, deliberate misinformation, records falsification, 
and the facilitation of civilian terrorism on the ground. According to a 
budget summary included in a CIA memorandum issued in 1975 and 
declassified in 2003, $270,000 of the operation’s three million dollar 
budget was devoted entirely to “psychological warfare and political 
action.”50 
In order to turn the tide of Guatemalan politics in its favor, the 
CIA was determined to rouse suspicion and resistance to the Arbenz 
administration. The Agency’s use of radio is particularly revealing in this 
regard. According to Grandin: 
  
The CIA used techniques borrowed from social psychology, 
Hollywood, and the advertising industry to erode loyalty and 
generate resistance. Radio shows incited government officials 
and soldiers to treason and attempted to convince 
Guatemalans that a widespread underground resistance 
movement existed. Claiming to be transmitted from “deep in 
the jungle” by rebel forces, the broadcasts were in fact taped 
in Miami and beamed into Guatemala from Nicaragua.51 
 
Such deception was commonplace in covert operations. Upon 
researching these radio broadcasts further, it becomes clear that the CIA 
poured enormous resources into this project. Codenamed operation 
SHERWOOD, this CIA-operated radio station, calling itself La Voz de la 
Liberación, combined “intimidating misinformation with pithy slogans” of 
anti-communism in order to “intimidate the Communists and their 
sympathizers and stimulate the apathetic majority to act.”52 Radio had 
proved integral in the CIA’s capacity to sway public opinion in Iran, 
where false reports convinced listeners that the tides were turning against 
Mossadeq; such misinformation played a significant role in altering public 
                                                       
50 See “CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz,” a classified CIA report filed 12 
May 1975, at http://www.foia.cia.gov. The amount of money put toward 
psychological warfare does not include other related costs, such as “subversion” 
($250,000), “intelligence operations” ($150,000), “arms and equipment” 
($400,000), “transport aircraft and maintenance” ($800,000), and “operation of 
the Nicaraguan training center” ($100,000) at which the CIA-recruited anti-
communist opposition was housed and trained until their U.S.-backed invasion 
of Guatemala in June 1954.  
51 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 77. 
52 Cullather, Secret History, 75-76. 
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opinion. However, Cullather argues that planners of PBSUCCESS placed 
excessive faith in “radio as a propaganda weapon” since, according to his 
estimates, only one in 50 Guatemalans owned a radio. Because this 
strategy “ignored local conditions,” its actual effectiveness is 
questionable.53 That the CIA implemented this intricate system of mass 
radio propaganda in spite of the fact that so few Guatemalans actually 
owned radios reaffirms this paper’s argument. Rather than consider the 
idiosyncratic complexities of each country in which it intervenes, the CIA 
adopted a blanket, formulaic, one-size-fits-all propaganda campaign when 
it came to swaying popular opinion and subverting communism.  
It is difficult to gauge the exact impact SHERWOOD exercised 
over Guatemalans. Nonetheless, the content of these radio programs in 
itself provides invaluable insight into the nature of the CIA’s attacks on 
Arbenz. As stated in a surprisingly blunt CIA review of the 
SHERWOOD operation: 
 
The themes employed in this propaganda operation are what 
might be expected. Communism is the great evil. It is anti-
God, anti-religion, anti-fatherland. President Arbenz is 
depicted not as a communist, but as a witting instrument of 
the Kremlin who has sold the country out to international 
communism, and who will be betrayed and destroyed by the 
communists whenever he is no longer useful to them…. 
Arbenz is regularly vilified throughout the broadcasts. The 
army is a primary target of the propaganda…. Other clear 
targets of the propaganda are intellectuals, women, workers, 
and peasants.54 
 
This sober description of the broadcasts produced under SHERWOOD 
implies that the CIA made conscious efforts to destabilize Guatemalan 
politics and demonize Arbenz, equating him with all things antithetical to 
traditional Latin American values—religion, patriarchy, loyalty, and the 
like. And as in Iran, La Voz de la Liberación intended to incite 
Guatemalans to join an opposition movement that did not actually exist. 
Not surprisingly, there is no evidence to suggest that the CIA knew what 
                                                       
53 Cullather, Secret History, 41. 
54 See “The Sherwood Tapes,” estimated publication date 1 January 1954, at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000135031/DOC_0000135031.pdf. This 
document contains no mention of its author(s) or the circumstances under 
which it was written; nor does it provide any clear date of publication (the 
“estimated publication date” of 1/1/54 is nonsensical since SHERWOOD 
operated until 2 July of that same year, shutting down only after Arbenz’s had 
resigned). Regardless, this comprehensive document analyzes in great detail all 
aspects of the project.  
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would happen in Guatemala once Arbenz had been deposed, nor had any 
plans been made as to how the CIA would cooperate with the new 
leader, Castillo Armas. This lack of foresight would later prove disastrous 
for the stability of Guatemalan society. 
Even more menacing was the CIA’s complicity in outright 
civilian violence against members of the PGT. Of particular interest to 
the Agency was the Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas 
(CEUA), a small group of university students that, with CIA weapons 
and training, staged campaigns of terror, sabotage, bombing, and 
propaganda in Guatemala City, the country’s capital and urban center.55 
Meanwhile, “PBSUCCESS propagandists also spread rumors that land 
reform was simply a prelude to collectivized agriculture, state farms, and 
forced labor.”56 
On the home front, the U.S. government made efforts to quell 
any doubts that the events unfolding in Guatemala were supported or 
encouraged by American forces. In a striking moment early in 1954, the 
CIA was compromised when an American operative in Guatemala 
disclosed the details of PBSUCCESS to Arbenz himself. Arbenz 
immediately released this information to the public. The U.S. denied the 
charges, however, writing them off as a political stunt. The State 
Department issued an official public response to the allegations, 
affirming that: 
 
The charge is ridiculous and untrue. It is the policy of the 
Untied States not to intervene in the internal affairs of other 
nations. That policy has repeatedly been reaffirmed under the 
present administration…. The United States views the 
issuance of this false accusation immediately prior to the 
Tenth Inter-American Conference as a Communist effort to 
disrupt the work of this conference and the Inter-American 
solidarity which is so vital to all the nations of the 
hemisphere.57 
                                                       
55 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 82-84. Grandin deems the students of the 
CEUA “the foot soldiers of Operation PBSUCCESS,” distributing anti-
communist newspapers, leaflets, and comic books in their efforts to “educate,” 
or perhaps reeducate, the masses. In his discussion on the anti-Arbenz student 
organization, Grandin insinuates that the CIA provided the CEUA not only with 
arms but “a number of manuals with instructions on how to plan and execute 
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56 Cullather, Secret History, 61. 
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Although we know this statement to be false, it was naturally accepted as 
fact among the American public and the popular media. Following the 
issuance of the above response, newspapers immediately mimicked the 
State Department’s rhetoric, asserting that Arbenz was making false 
accusations out of desperation to maintain his own power. In Guatemala, 
the fact that Arbenz’s charges failed to gain traction on the international 
stage made civilians worried that their president was preparing to crack 
down on democratic freedoms.58 Strangely and ironically, all of this 
appears to have strengthened the CIA’s cause. Far from undermining 
their potential to engage in covert operations, this incident reinforced the 
notion that CIA agents were untouchable and infallible. At the same 
time, Arbenz had somehow become the boy who cried wolf—despite the 
veracity of his allegations, the American public and media passively 
accepted the U.S. government’s denial to the point at which even hard 
evidence would not sway their opinions. In their minds, the United States 
could declare only unconditional truth. “Red Jacobo,” on the other hand, 
could not be trusted.  
Available CIA documents suggest that a mid-May arms shipment 
carrying weapons from Czechoslovakia to Guatemala’s Puerto Barrios 
triggered the culmination of PBSUCCESS: the invasion of Guatemala 
and the coup against Arbenz. Delivered on a Swedish freighter called the 
Alfhem, the arms—originally possessions of Nazi Germany and 
confiscated by Czech forces following World War II—were purchased 
secretly by Arbenz and his PGT allies; according to Cullather, Arbenz 
and the PGT sought to clandestinely give a portion of these arms to 
workers’ militias in order to create a sort of buffer between Arbenz and 
the anticommunist military.59 Needless to say, after the CIA exposed the 
shipment, the arms purchase was an American propaganda goldmine. 
The Washington Post wrote that the “threat of Communist imperialism 
is no longer academic; it has arrived,” and Congressman Paul Lantaff is 
quoted proclaiming, “If Paul Revere were living today, he would view the 
landing of Red arms in Guatemala as a signal to ride.”60 
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60 Quoted in Cullather, Secret History, 79. Similarly sensationalist reporting can 
also be found in the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. The above allusion 
to Paul Revere is particularly intriguing. Apart from its hyperbolic appeal to 
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And so the invasion began: as CIA-trained Guatemalan exiles 
filtered into the country, the Guatemalan military backed down without a 
serious fight. Realizing that he had lost the army, Arbenz tried in vain to 
arm the masses. However, on 26 June, the civilian army Arbenz had 
envisioned failed to emerge. Left with no other options, the president 
reverted to the inevitable: on 27 June 1954, Arbenz announced his 
resignation.  
On 30 June, Secretary of State Dulles addressed the American 
public. “Tonight, I should like to talk with you about Guatemala,” he 
began. He continued: 
 
It is the scene of dramatic events. They expose the evil 
purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system, 
and they test the ability of the American States to maintain the 
peaceful integrity of this hemisphere. For several years 
international communism has been probing here and there for 
nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a 
spot which it could turn into an official base from which to 
breed subversion which would extend to other American 
Republics…. Arbenz, who until this week was President of 
Guatemala, was openly manipulated by the leaders of 
communism…. If world communism captures any American 
State, however small, a new and perilous front is established 
which will increase the danger to the entire free world and 
require even greater sacrifices from the American people…. 
Led by Colonel Castillo Armas, patriots arose in Guatemala to 
challenge the Communist leadership and to change it. This the 
situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves…. 
The United States pledges itself not merely to political 
opposition to communism but to help to alleviate conditions 
in Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism 
an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the 
hemisphere. Thus we shall seek in positive ways to make our 
Americas an example which will inspire men everywhere.61 
 
                                                                                                                      
the shadows and takes away their Ten Years of Spring. Could Arbenz be 
considered a Paul Revere-esque historical figure in Guatemalan folklore? Given 
the guerilla warfare that endured for decades following Arbenz’s forced 
resignation and exile, it indeed appears that the reforms he unleashed and the 
values he preached left a lasting mark on the collective consciousness of the 
Guatemalan people. 
61 “International Communism in Guatemala: Address by the Secretary of State, 
June 30, 1954; Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks,” 
John Foster Dulles. The excerpts included are those most relevant to the 
discussion at hand. For the full text of the speech, see Department of State 
Bulletin 12 July 1954, 43-45.  
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These remarks encapsulate the U.S. government’s message to the 
American public following the events that led to Arbenz’s resignation 
and, ultimately, decades of instability in the region. Dulles’s speech also 
reveals the blatant discrepancy between the government’s public rhetoric 
and its behavior behind closed doors. According to this double standard, 
human freedom is an inalienable right so long as the US does not 
disagree with others’ expression of that freedom; suffrage and 
representative democracy are fundamental to liberty so long as a nation’s 
elected leaders do not resist US political and economic interests abroad. 
 
Conclusion: The Case Against Historical Amnesia 
 
Jacobo Arbenz was among the first victims of Cold Warfare at 
the hands of an increasingly powerful post-WWII United States. To the 
detriment of millions abroad, the tactics used to oust Arbenz would soon 
be adopted in covert operations worldwide to remove those leaders 
hostile to U.S. interests—even if democratically elected—and replace 
them with leaders friendly to U.S. hegemony—even if dictatorial.  
The Arbenz affair is a crucial piece of history for a number of 
reasons. For the Guatemalan people, this is most pertinently because 
Castillo Armas, Arbenz’s U.S.-backed successor, ushered in an immediate 
period of political instability that soon gave way to a decades-long period 
of partisan violence, corruption, and coercion, particularly against the 
indigenous masses. Operation PBSUCCESS was successful only in 
achieving its immediate aim—to oust Arbenz. Looking any further than 
that, however, reveals the overwhelmingly negative consequences of U.S. 
covert action in the region. 
Less obviously, Arbenz symbolizes a key component of modern 
American history. It was the U.S. “triumph” over Arbenz and the 
perceived threat of international communism that provided the Central 
Intelligence Agency with the reputation of stealth, strength, and 
competence that it enjoys today. The CIA’s rise to prominence also had 
significant consequences for clandestine operations and intelligence 
agencies throughout the world. “Following the costly Korean War,” 
Grandin writes, “U.S. foreign policy moved away from frontal assaults on 
Communism toward more indirect methods of containing subversion, 
primarily through the strengthening of the internal security capabilities of 
its allies. In its sphere of influence in the Third World, the United States 
helped to establish or fortify central intelligence agencies.”62 Indeed, as 
we see following the removal of Arbenz in 1954, Guatemala enjoyed—
with U.S. support—an unprecedented proliferation in government 
intelligence and information gathering. These newly available resources 
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would soon contribute directly to the terrorism, subjugation, and 
massacres inflicted upon any real or perceived subversives throughout 
the country.  
The United States also displayed its condescension toward 
Guatemala on multiple occasions and through multiple avenues. In 
addition to Secretary of State Dulles’s speech cited above, a July 1954 
column from the New York Times titled “The Castillo Armas Regime” 
reads:  
 
As was generally expected…Lieut. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas 
has been chosen head of the anti-Communist junta in 
Guatemala…. Norteamericanos may with all earnestness wish 
this slight, tired-voiced, bright-eyed little Colonel well. 
Because in very large measure how he does will affect the 
regard with which we ourselves are held by the other Latin 
Americans for years to come.63 
 
In patronizing language, this column portrays the murderous Castillo 
Armas as if he were a simply boy embarking on an adventure worthy of 
U.S. patronage. The New York Times gives him full support, of course, 
but not without first establishing for its readers that the U.S. still 
considers its Central American neighbors inferior. 
Furthermore, PBSUCCESS had implications far beyond the 
borders of Guatemala. Westad notes, “Guatemala was seen in 
Washington as a template for future success, even after the 
interventionist strategy had failed in quelling the Cuban revolution in 
1961. As one CIA analyst observed later: ‘The language, arguments, and 
techniques of the Arbenz episode were used in Cuba in the early 1960s, 
in Brazil in 1964, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Chile in 
1973.’ ”64 As this paper has argued, the CIA’s covert operations reveal its 
tendency to generalize and oversimplify matters that demand more 
complex considerations. Although PBSUCCESS was nominally 
successful in the short-run, later attempts to build upon this success with 
similar models of intervention in places like Cuba, Brazil, and Chile 
proved more damaging than the U.S. government could possibly have 
realized.  
Finally, Guatemala in 1954 was significant in the grander scheme 
of the Cold War itself. According to a member of the National Security 
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Council, Guatemala represented “in miniature all of the social cleavages, 
tensions, and dilemmas of modern Western society under attack by the 
Communist virus. We should regard Guatemala as a prototype area for 
testing means and methods of combating Communism.”65 I would take 
this one-sided outlook further: Guatemala represented not only a 
“prototype” for future U.S. foreign policy, but, in a historical perspective, 
a standard model of Cold War tensions, miscommunication, and 
oversimplification. That is, Guatemala demonstrates on a small scale the 
much larger, more abstract origins underpinning the inscrutable Cold 
War era. By acting on its suspicions and intervening to an increasing 
degree in Guatemalan affairs, the United States drove Arbenz to become 
what they saw him to be, something he might otherwise not have been—
not a communist, but a good man left with fewer and fewer options 
except to cling more tightly to his PGT allies. In short, the U.S. engaged 
in what is known in psychological terms as “self-fulfilling prophecies,” in 
which our expectations are met because we act in such a way that the 
expected outcome is the only one possible. This, mixed with grave 
uncertainty, contributed to the strained U.S.-Guatemalan relations in the 
1940s and ‘50s as well as the Cold War tensions throughout the latter half 
of the 20th century.  
I close with a word on American nationalism and historical 
amnesia. In addition to the abovementioned Cold War tensions, the ways 
the U.S. government responded to the perceived Guatemalan threat of 
communism were understandable, but unacceptable: I say this not with 
regard to the CIA or the State Department, but to the American public 
itself. Regardless of the role of United Fruit, the United States intervened 
in Guatemala on false or unsubstantiated grounds. The moment the 
government suspected that communists had infiltrated the ranks of the 
Arévalo and Arbenz administrations, the overwhelming majority of the 
American populace had jumped on the bandwagon to exterminate 
communists from the western hemisphere; too few had the willingness 
and the courage to think critically, resist conformity, and second-guess 
Washington’s policies toward its Central American neighbor. There is no 
way to tell whether the CIA might have approached the Arbenz regime 
differently if it had allowed itself the opportunity to understand the state 
they were about to overthrow. That is an unsolvable matter.  
However, in the present, American citizens do have the power to 
prevent such injustices from occurring—to voice dissent when their 
government acts not out of rationality or even the common good, but 
out of hubris, paranoia, and insensitivity. These factors, in short, led to 
the CIA’s intervention in Guatemala. It is disheartening that today, in the 
contemporary United States, unwarranted and arrogant interventions of 
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this sort are still allowed to occur: specifically, President George W. 
Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. As in the case of Guatemala, the 
American public supported this intervention largely on emotional 
grounds—Americans responded precisely as expected to buzzwords like 
“freedom,” “patriotism,” and “democracy.” President Bush’s appeals to 
American nationalism, in short, served to convince the American 
populace that war in Iraq was justified in much the same way that 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles convinced the public 
that Arbenz’s communist allies threatened their freedom, democracy, and 
the American way of life.  
Richard Hughes writes that “there is perhaps no more 
compelling task for Americans to accomplish in the 21st Century than to 
learn to see the world through someone else’s eyes.”66 Indeed, as a way of 
doing so, it is time the citizens of the United States learn from their 
country’s own history. It would be a disservice to the nation they so 
dearly love and a dishonor to those abroad, like Jacobo Arbenz and the 
Guatemalan masses, who have paid steeply and unnecessarily for the sake 
of American hegemony. The rise of the CIA in the aftermath of 
Guatemalan intervention signified American hubris precisely because the 
antithesis to hubris is humility, and it is humility before our history of 



















                                                       
66 Quoted in Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 63. 




“Charges of Intervention in Guatemala Denied.” Department of State 
Bulletin vol. 30, January-March 1954. Accessed at 
http://www.archive.org. 
“CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz.” 12 May 1975. 
Accessed at http://www.foia.cia.gov. 
“Clinical Report on Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala.” 12 
April 1954. Accessed at http://www.foia.cia.gov. 
Cullather, Nick. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in 
Guatemala, 1952-1954. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1999. 
Dulles, John Foster. “International Communism in Guatemala: Address 
by the Secretary of State, June 30, 1954; Delivered to the Nation 
over radio and television networks.” Department of State 
Bulletin 12 July 1954. 
Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States, 1944-1954. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991. 
Gleijeses, Piero. “The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz.” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 21.3 (October 1989): 453-480. 
Grandin, Greg. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Handy, Jim. Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in 
Guatemala, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994. 
Immerman, Richard H. “Guatemala as Cold War History.” Political Science 
Quarterly 95.4 (Winter 1980-1981): 629-653. 
Lieven, Anatol. America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American 
Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
“NSC 162/2: A Report to the National Security Council.” United States 
National Security Council doc. NSC 162/2. 30 October 1953. 
Accessed at http://www.fas.org. 
Schlesinger, Stephen C., and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story 
of the American Coup in Guatemala. Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1982. 
“The Castillo Armas Regime.” The New York Times, 11 July 
 1954. 
“The Sherwood Tapes.” 1 January 1954. Accessed at 
 http://www.foia.cia.gov. 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
